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Abstract
The notion of Hidden Credentials can be applied to pro-
tection of sensitive credentials, resources and policies in
Trust Negotiation. It allows the server to encrypt a resource
so that only the client with the correct credentials can de-
crypt it. The existing scheme of hidden credentials requires
that the server grant access to the encrypted resource di-
rectly to the client during the negotiation without knowing
whether or not the client can decrypt it. It would be a bur-
den if the resources were very large. We found that when
the server grants access to services rather than resources,
the existing hidden credentials schemes are insecure under
our policy attacks, since the server can illegally learn the
client’s credentials from the attack. In this paper, we pro-
pose a scheme to stop the server from mounting a policy
attack.
1. Introduction
In Trust Negotiation, two strange parties can exchange
digital credentials that contain some attributes of informa-
tion for access control. Hidden Credential stems from the
paradigm of Trust Negotiation [6, 7, 8], which guards sen-
sitive resources by attribute-based policies that can be ful-
filled by publicly verifiable digital credentials issued by
some third party.
Conceptually, a trust negotiation problem is given as fol-
lows. Let us denote by Alice and Bob the participants,
where Alice is the client and Bob is the server. Bob grants
∗This work is partially supported by a grant from the Fund of National
Natural Science Foundation of China (#60502047), Education Bureau of
Fujian Province (#JB05329)
access to sensitive resources to his clients who have the cor-
rect credentials. Because of the sensitivity, Bob does not
want to reveal his policies in order to protect his sensitive
resources. Alice has a correct credential, but she doesn’t
want to disclose her credential to Bob. Some recent works
[2, 3, 9] have performed this type of attribute-based access
controls for protecting Alice’s credentials and Bob’s poli-
cies [5]. Based on identity-based encryption (IBE) in [1], it
is not hard to achieve hidden credentials.
In hidden credential, Bob encrypts a resource in such a
way that Alice can decrypt it if she has the right creden-
tials [2], where the encryption key is Bob’s policy and the
decryption key is Alice’s credential. There are three key
properties in a hidden credential system: (1) Protection of
Alice’s sensitive credentials. Bob never sees Alice’s creden-
tial and never knows whether Alice can access the resource.
(2) Protection of Bob’s sensitive policies. When Bob en-
crypts his resource that Alice needs, Alice can decrypt it if
her credential matches one of Bob’s policies. If not, she will
learn nothing about Bob’s resource (3) Protection of Bob’s
sensitive resources. The encrypted resource is not usable
if one does not have the right credential; therefore, the re-
sources are hidden safely.
1.1. Related Work and Analysis
Based on Boneh-Franklin’s IBE [1], Holt et al intro-
duced the notion of hidden credentials [2]. They gave a
formal description of hidden credentials and gave an appli-
cation of hidden credentials. Frikken et al later improved
computational efficiency of hidden credential decryption
and enhanced security with a secret splitting scheme [9].
The existing schemes of hidden credentials can pro-
tect privacy of both Alice and Bob. Assuming that Bob
does not grant access to services but resources, Bob never
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knows whether Alice can access to resources she requested.
Frikken et al showed this drawback in [4]. In practice, the
server could grant access to services rather than resources.
It means that the server determines whether a client can ac-
cess to a resource or not but doesn’t transmit the resource to
the client directly.
In hidden credentials, Alice can protect her credentials
and Bob can protect his policies. However, it could be the
case that Alice would only learn part of policies if she had
decrypted the ciphertext from Bob. In [4], the situation is
improved that Alice cannot learn Bob’s credentials and poli-
cies and Bob can not learn Alice’s credentials and policies
(in the case of mutual negotiation). Furthermore, Alice can
not learn any policy even if she has accessed the resource,
because which credential satisfies which Bob’s policy is in-
distinguishable to her.
Although the scheme in [4] offers better privacy protec-
tion than the other schemes of hidden credentials, we found
that Alice can learn Bob’s policies when she requests to ac-
cess a resource repeatedly. For example, let Alice’s creden-
tials be {C1, C2, C3, C4} and she can access a resource with
the credentials in the first trust negotiation, but she does not
know which credential satisfies Bob’s policy. Then, Alice
can request another access to the same resource with a sub-
set of {C1, C2, C3, C4}, if she can access the resource with
{C1, C2} and {C2, C3} but not with {C1, C3}, Alice learns
that the credential C2 must satisfy Bob’s policy, therefore
Bob’s policy leaks.
Based on the scenario that Bob grants services, there will
be another private problem we have to address. If Alice
can access a resource, Bob learns that her credentials sat-
isfy his policies (does not which one). Alice’s credentials
can be hidden from Bob when Bob’s policies are a large
set. For a small set of policies, Bob will then have a better
chance to guess Alice’s credentials. Therefore, to mount an
attack, Bob can set his policies with a lot of random strings
such that they are indistinguishable to Alice. Actually, there
could be only one Bob’s policy matches with a credential.
If Alice had accessed the resource with the correct creden-
tial, she would reveal her credential to Bob (so-called per-
ilous policy attacks). For example, Bob can set his policies
PBob = P1 ∨ P2 ∨ P3 which matches with the credential
C1, C2, or C3, but the credentials C2 and C3 do not exist at
all (according to Bob’s setting). If Alice can access to the
resource, Bob learns that Alice must possess the credential
C1.
We found that the flaw of the schemes in [2, 9, 4] is due to
the fact that Alice cannot verify Bob’s policies. Therefore,
we propose an approach of zero-knowledge proof to Bob’s
policies, where Alice can verify whether Bob has mounted
a policy attack but knows nothing about Bob’s policies.
1.2. Our Contributions
We propose a novel scheme of hidden credentials which
can protect Alice’s credentials from policy attacks in the
following scenarios: (1) Alice’s credentials can be hidden:
Bob never learns her credentials accurately but only knows
her credentials satisfy his policies. (2) Bob’s policies can
be hidden: Alice never learns his policies without right cre-
dentials but only knows part of Bob’s policies which her
credentials satisfy. (3) User Anonymity: Bob does not know
who accesses a resource. (4) Service-oriented: Bob grants
access to services and knows whether a client can access the
corresponding resource or not.
2. Definitions and Notations
Bilinear Pairing. Let G1 be (additive) cyclic group of
prime order q. Let P,Q be a generator of G1. A map
ê : G1 ×G1 → G2 (here G2 is a multiplicative group such
that |G1| = |G2| = q) is called a bilinear pairing if this
map satisfies the following properties: (1) Bilinear: for all
P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Zp, we have ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab.
(2) Non-degeneracy: ê(P, P ) = 1. In other words, if
P be a generator of G1, then ê(P, P ) generates G2. (3)
Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute
ê(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
ID-Based Encryption (IBE).
Setup. Choose a random generator P ∈ G1. Pick a ran-
dom s ∈ Z∗q and set Ppub = sP . Choose four crypto-
graphic hash functions H1, · · · ,H4. H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1;
H2 : G2 → {0, 1}n; H3 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → Z∗q ; H4 :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. The message space is M = {0, 1}n.
The parameters are params = 〈q, G1, G2, ê, n, P, Ppub,
H1,H2.H3,H4〉. The master-key is s.
Extract. For a given string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute QID =
H1(ID) ∈ G1, set the private key dID to be dID = sQID
where s is the master-key.
Encrypt. To encrypt M ∈ {0, 1}n under the public key
ID, compute QID = H1(ID) ∈ G1, choose a random
σ ∈ {0, 1}n, set r = H3(σ,M), and set the ciphertext
to be〈U, V,W 〉 = 〈rP, σ ⊕ H2(grID),H4(σ) ⊕M〉 where
gID = ê(QID, Ppub) ∈ G2.
Decrypt. Let 〈U, V,W 〉 be a ciphertext encrypted using the
public key ID. If U ∈ G∗
1
, abort. To decrypt M with the
private-key dID ∈ G1, compute V ⊕H2(ê(dID, U)) = σ,
compute W ⊕H4(σ) = M , and set r = H3(σ,M). Check
if U = rP . If not, abort. Output M as the decryption of
〈U, V,W 〉.
Policy and Credential. Using ID-Based Encryption, ID is
denoted as a Policy and private key dID as a Credential. In
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our paper, we use Pi to denote a policy and Ci a correspond-
ing credential.
Simple Policy. A simple policy consists of a set of at-
tributes. For example, an attribute could be “president” or
“dean”. If a resource is encrypted with a simple policy, the
ciphertext can be decrypted with an associated credential
matching the policy.
Complex Policy. A complex policy consists of multiple
simple policies with monotonic Boolean function ∨ and
∧. For example, A complex policy could be defined as
PBob = P1∨(P2∧P3)∨(P4∧P5). In order to access Bob’s
resources, Alice’s credentials must include {C1}, {C2, C3},
or {C4, C5}, which match Bob’s policies. For example, if
Alice has credentials {C1, C2}, she will be granted with ac-
cess to the corresponding resource, but rejected if she only
has credentials {C2, C4}.
One-Time Password (OTP). The OTP is randomly chosen
by Bob and can be used only once. If a client requests to ac-
cess a resource, Bob will randomly choose a OTP encrypted
with his policies. If the client can send the OTP back to Bob,
the client is granted with an access to the resource.
Simple Encryption (SE). The ciphertext of SE is the tuple:
〈U, V,W 〉 = 〈rPgene, σ ⊕ H2(grpi),H4(σ) ⊕ M〉 where
Pgene is a generator of G1 and M is a message that contains
OTP. The ciphertext is encrypted with policy Pi and can
only be decrypted with Ci. So, if Bob’s policy is PBob =
Ppresident, Alice will reveal her credential Cpresident when
she can decrypt the ciphertext.
Complex Encryption (CE). For PBob = (P1 ∧P2)∨P3 ∨
P4, the ciphertext of CE is the tuple: 〈U, V1, V2, V3,W 〉 =
〈rPgene, σ ⊕ H2(grp1) ⊕ H2(grp2), σ ⊕ H2(grp3), σ ⊕
H2(grp4),H4(σ) ⊕ M〉. M is encrypted with diversity of
policies and can be decrypted with diversity of credentials
too. The difference between SE and CE is that r in later is
not set by r = H3(σ,M) but randomly chosen by Bob [9].
In CE, Alice decrypts M from one of Vi, therefore her
credentials are indistinguishable to Bob if he encrypted OTP
honestly. However, in practice Bob must be able to prove
security against a policy attack.
Trust Parameters (TP). Each TP has a parameter and a
signature which can prove that the policy in the parameter
is valid. The parameter is set by gr0Pi = ê(QPi , r0Ppub) =
ê(QPi , Ppub)
r0 , where r0 is secretly chosen by Bob; the sig-
nature is set by Sgn(H2(gr0Pi)). We denote by TP (Pi, r0)
the parameter and signature of policy Pi with r0. So, if Bob
shows TP (Pi, r0) to Alice, she will learn nothing but the
policy is valid (see section 5 for detail analysis).
Notations. Denote by PKG the trust third party who sets
all policies PPKG and issues all credentials and TP. De-
note by DSgn the public key which can verify TP. For ex-
ample, if Bob shows TP (Pi, r0) to Alice, she can verify
H2(ê(QPi , Ppub)
r0) ?= Dsgn(TP (Pi, r0)). Denote by σ∗
a fix bit and σ∗ = 1t for some constant t. It is used to
help Alice make a judgement of correct decryption. De-
note by RBob an OTP randomly chosen by Bob. Denote
by STP the intersection of two sets. One is computed by
Bob through his policies, the other is computed by Alice
through TP. Denote by NAlice the minimum numbers of
valid policies, in which Alice can ensure that her creden-
tials are indistinguishable to Bob.
3. Our Scheme
In this section, we present our novel scheme that is se-
cure against the policy attack.
Parameter Phase:
PKG broadcasts the params to all users. params =
〈q, G1, G2, ê, t, n, Pgene, Ppub, σ∗, DSgn,H1,H2,H3,H4〉.
The params is the same as in the IBE. In addition, we
pick σ∗ = 1t and a public key DSgn for verifying TP.
The user transmits his/her identity credential and Pi to
the PKG in security. The PKG verifies the credential and
Pi. If the user qualifies to possess Ci, the PKG computes
QPi = H1(Pi) ∈ G1, Ci = sQPi and transmits Ci to the
user.
Trust Parameters:
Bob computes r0Ppub and transmits r0Ppub, P1, P2, · · · ,
Pk to the PKG, where P1, P2, · · · , Pk are Bob’s policies.
The PKG checks P1, P2, · · · , Pk
?∈ PPKG. If P1, P2, · · · ,
Pk are valid, the PKG computes TP (Pi, r0), i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , k} and transmits them to Bob.
Request:
Alice makes an access “request” to Bob. If Bob’s policies
are PBob = P1 ∨ P2 · · · ∨ Pk, Bob computes HCE(PBob):
Compute QPi = H1(Pi) ∈ G1, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}.
Choose a random σ
′ ∈ {0, 1}n−t and set the σ with
σ = σ∗‖σ′ ∈ {0, 1}n. Compute r = H3(σ,M). Com-
pute gPi = ê(QPi , Ppub) ∈ G2, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}. Set
ciphertext HCE(PBob) = 〈rr0Pgene, σ ⊕ H2(grr0p1 ), σ ⊕
H2(grr0p2 ), · · · , σ ⊕ H2(grr0pk ),H4(σ) ⊕M〉, where M are
RBob and TP (Pi, r0), i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}.
Alice receives the ciphertext HCE(PBob) =
〈U, V1, V2, · · · , Vk,W 〉 from Bob. Assume that Alice
has credential Cm. Alice does the following: Compute
ê(Cm, U) = ê(Cm, rr0Pgene) = ê(QPm , Pgene)
rr0s =
ê(QPm , Ppub)
rr0 = grr0Pm . Compute V1 ⊕ H2(grr0Pm ) = σ.
If σ∗ ∈ σ, then compute W ⊕ H4(σ) = M and output
M as the decryption of the HCE(PBob); else go to (2) to
compute V2 ⊕H2(grr0Pm ) = σ with V2, until Vk.
If Alice cannot output M as decryption of HCE(PBob),
she has to stop negotiation. Bob then is unable to receive
RBob from Alice and stops negotiation. Consequently, Al-
1-4244-0605-6/06/$20.00 ©2006 IEEE. 1293
ice fails to access to the resource; otherwise, Alice contin-
ues the verification process.
Alice does the following: Verify ê(QPi , Ppub)
r0 , i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , k} are valid with TP (Pi, r0) and DPKG. Com-
pute
(
ê(QPi , Ppub)
r0
)r
, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} with r. Com-
pute σ ⊕ H2
(
ê(QPi , Ppub)
rr0
)
, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}. Com-
pute the intersection of two sets: STP = {σ ⊕
H2
(
ê(QPi , Ppub)
rr0
)
, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · k}} ∩ {V1, V2, · · ·Vk}.
If |STP | < NAlice, stop the negotiation; else, continue the
process.
Response Phase:
Alice gets RBob from M and transmit it to Bob. Bob checks
whether RBob is correct or not. If not, Bob will reject Alice
from accessing the resource, else she is granted with the
corresponding resource.
With no decryption effort at all, any client(without cre-
dentials) knows how many policies in HCE(PBob) from
〈V1, V2, · · · , Vk〉. Bob can use dummy policy to hide his
policies. For instance, if PBob = P1 ∨ P2, he can encrypt
HCE(PBob) with PBob = P1 ∨ P2 ∨ P∗3 ∨ P∗4 where P∗i
are not exist at all.
Trust Parameters can be used repeatedly. The policy in
TP (Pi, r0) is hidden from Alice (we will analyse it in sec-
tion 5). So, Bob can get TP from the PKG only once and
use it repeatedly.
4. Security Analysis
We present three computational hard problems here on
which the security of IBE and our scheme is based.
(1) Discrete Logarithm Problem (DL). Given two ele-
ments P,Q ∈ G1,find an integer α ∈ Z∗q such that
Q = αP whenever such an integer exists.
(2) Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH). Given
〈P, aP, bP 〉 for some unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q where P is a
generator of G1, compute abP .
(3) Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDH). Given
〈P, aP, bP, cP 〉 for some unknown a, b, c ∈ Z∗q where
P is a generator of G1, compute W = ê(P, P )abc ∈
G2.
Bob’s policies are hidden from Alice. Even if Alice can
decrypt the HCE(PBob) with Cm and knows that Pm ∈
PBob and Pm ∈ TP (Pi, r0). Let g = ê(QPm , Ppub) and
h = ê(QPm , Ppub)
r0 , the CDH problem holds. So r0 is
hidden to Alice.
For {P,QPs , Ppub, r0P} (Psis a policy supposed by Al-
ice), the BDH problem holds. So, Alice cannot compute
ê(QPs , Ppub)
r0 and verify gr0Ps
?∈ TP.
With σ and r, Alice can verify σ⊕H2(grr0Ps )
?∈ {V1, V2,
V3, · · · , Vk} iff she can compute gr0Ps . From the above, We
know that Alice will fail to verify.
Our scheme is secure against Bob’s policy attacks (Al-
ice’s credentials are hidden from Bob). In our scheme,
how many policies are valid in HCE(PBob) can be learned
from STP , which is computed by TP. Because Bob cannot
get TP of dummy policy, then it is impossible for Bob to
mount an attack from policies. Alice’s credentials are hid-
den from Bob for that she can learn STP and decides to
continue or not.
Because of the space restriction, we will provide security
proofs in the full version of this paper.
5. Conclusion
We showed how a perilous attack in hidden credentials
from the Bob’s policy will reveal Alice’s sensitive creden-
tials. We proposed a novel scheme that is secure against the
policy attack, using trust parameters. In our scheme, Alice
can find whether Bob launched an attack and then decide if
the resource access should be granted.
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